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WILFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT IN
AUTOMOBILE GUEST CASES
By JOHN A. APPLEMAN -

There is one major difference between high caliber jurists
and those of mediocre ability-a difference which is demonstrated in innumerable situations. It springs out of an incoherence of thought in most cases, while in others it arises
out of an inability to express conclusions in a concise and
logical manner. This lack of acuteness referred to-this
difference between high and low grade jurists-is the ability
to properly define and apply legal terms as used in statutes
and the ability to separate one type of culpability from another similar to and related to the first type. Sometimes this
failure has little practical importance and the legal result may
not be thereby affected. In other situations, however, as in
that here presented, it is of major seriousness. Failure to
observe and recognize proper distinctions upon this question
may serve to establish or to deny verdicts. It is precisely
because this question is of such paramount importance and
because the law is rapidly becoming so muddled in this respect
that some logical discussion is essential.
This question is neither moot nor academic. The statutes
of Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Ohio, Utah and now Indiana apply the term "wilful and
wanton", or a phrasing essential similar, in their guest
statutes. Other states make it a partial test, along with
some other legal measure of culpability. Such other states
include Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. Since all of these states are constantly called upon
to interpret their own statutes, and because decisions of those
states are given judicial cognizance elsewhere in other situations, this question has a very important place in the active
law.
* Of the Bloomington, Illinois, Bar.
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Precisely what does this phrase mean? Are the words
"wilful" and "wanton" purely repetitive? It would seem so
from the confusion existing in the minds of even some of the
most eminent authorities in the field of automobile law.
Blashfield has defined wanton misconduct as "the intentional
or wanton disregard of the safety of others, as is manifested
by conduct which is of such a character as to indicate the
autoist's indifference to the consequences of his acts." 1 "Wilful
misconduct," the definition reads, "is the intentional doing
of something which should not be done, or intentional failure
to do something which should be done, in the operation of
the automobile, under circumstances tending to disclose the
operator's knowledge, express or implied, that an injury to
the guest will be a probable result of such conduct ' 2 This
is a fairly clear distinction if Blashfield's test is accepted.
Berry, on the other hand, gives almost exactly the same definition for wantonness as Blashfield has given for wilful misconduct. " 'Wantonness,' as in the operation of an automobile, is the conscious doing of some act or the omission of
some duty with knowledge of existing conditions, and conscious that, from the act or omission, injury will likely result
to another." 3
Here we have two excellent authorities in this field in a
dispute of some seriousness. If both are correct then the
terms are of similar import-they are repetitive and interchangeable. Either this must be the true situation or one of
the above writers has been lax in his definition. It might be
well to examine the legal background of these phrases to
some extent, although space cannot allow an exhaustive
analysis.
In Penal law the expressions "wilful" or "wilfully" implied
an intentional act, committed with knowledge of the probable
result. It meant more than mere voluntary carelessness.
Usually the idea of legal malice or of a wrongul intent was
1 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice, Permanent Edition,
Volume 4, Section 2322, page 109.
2 Blashfield, ibid, Section 2322, page 110.
S Berry, C. P., Automobiles, Seventh Edition, Section 2.340.
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included. 4 A great many courts have used the term in phases
of law other than penal to mean simply "intentional" without
including or implying a wrongful intent.4a The term "wanton"
had a different connotation. Its meaning always implied a
reprehensible act, but was not as broad as "wilful" in the
penal sense-though perhaps broader than some definitions
of "wilful." An act might be held wanton without being
wilful. The element of a wrongful intent could also be lacking. It was sufficient to constitute wantonness that an act
indicate a reckless disregard for consequences, and that an
unlawful act be committed without the specific intention of
injurying any person thereby.
These definitions were originally carried over into the field
of automobile law verbatim. There seems to be no doubt that
when legislatures first drafted guest statutes using the expressions wilful or wanton, they had the age-old meaning
of these terms in mind. Accordingly, we may say that the
terms most commonly used in automobile law may be arranged in the following ascending order of culpability: Negligence, Gross Negligence, Heedlessness, Recklessness, Wanton4"'Wilful' imports a much more positive affirmative mental condition
prompting the act than 'wanton'. Many judges hold, and with much reason,
that willful negligence is a contradiction-an anomaly. It has been generally
held that willful injury is not charged by an allegation that the act was committed recklessly, wantonly, or purposely, wrongfully, or unlawfully. Nor is
a charge of negligence equivalent to an allegation of a wrongful act." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Catlett (1910), 100 C. C. A. 489, 177 Fed. 71. See also:
Roberts v. United States (1903), 61 C. C. A. 427, 126 Fed. 897; United States
v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1908), 166 Fed. 160; United States v. Union
Pacific R. Co. (1909), 94 C. C. A. 433, 169 Fed. 65; McManus v. State (1860),
36 Ala. 285; Southern Ry. Co. v. McNeeley (1909), 44 Ind. App. 126, 88
N. E. 710; State v. Meek (1910), 148 Iowa 671, 127 N. W. 1023; Gambrell
v. Commonwealth (1908), 130 Ky. 513, 113 S. W. 476; Wass v. Stevens
(1891), 128 N. Y. 123, 28 N. E. 21; McMorris v. Howell (1903), 89 App.
Div. 272, 85 N. Y. S. 1018; People v. Gillies (1907), 57 Misc. 568, 109 N.
Y. S. 945; Miller v. State (1910), 3 Okla. Cr. 575, 107 P. 948.
4a See 68 Corpus Juris 266 et seq; and the hundreds of definitions given
therein.
5 Adler v. Martin (1912), 179 Ala. 97, 59 So. 597; Cochin v. El Paso S.
W. R. Co. (1910), 13 Ariz. 259, 108 P. 260; Belk v. Stewart (1912), 160
Mo. App. 706, 142 S. W. 485; People v. Gillies (1907), 57 Misc. 568, 109
N. Y. S. 945.
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ness, Wilfulness, and Intentional Acts-the latter two of
which are nearly identical in import. Negligence and gross
negligence were different degrees of one type of culpability
entirely separate and distinct from recklessness. Each of
those expressions is different in kind from wilful or wanton
misconduct. All have one striking similarity-that the party
committing the wrongful act has not respected the legal rights
of the injured party and has violated the rights of such
person. Apart from that they are each separate and distinct
types of wrongs, differing in the nature of the act committed
and in the intention of the tort-feasor. Blashfield has aptly
stated, "The difference is one of kind, not merely of degree. '",
One of the most acute distinctions ever made was brought
out by a Kansas court: "One who is properly charged with
recklessness or wantonness is not simply more careless than
one who is only guilty of negligence. His conduct must be
such as to put him in a class with the wilful doer of wrong.
The only respect in which his attitude is less blameworthy
than that of the intentional wrongdoer is that, instead of affirmatively wishing to injure another, he is merely willing to
do so. The difference is that between him who casts a missle
intending that it shall strike another and him who casts it
where he has reason to believe it will strike another, being
indifferent whether it does so or not." 7 If this test were
applied in many of the automobile cases today, much less
confusion would be apparent. Such confusion exists even
among some legislators since Vermont, in its guest statute,
sets up the test of "wilful negligence." 8 The terms are mutually inconsistent and by their own definitions, are mutually
exclusionary. Babbitt continuously employs the same confused terminology as if he does not understand the inconsistency thereof.s"
The difficulty in properly applying the terms referred to
8Blashfield, ibid, Volume 4, Section 2771, page 516.

7Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Baker (1908), 79 Kans. 183,
98 P. 804.
s Section 5113, Public Laws of Vermont, 1933 (Act No. 78, 1929).
Sa See Babbitt, Chas. J., Motor Vehicle Law, 4th Edition, Sec. 1433, page
1012.
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may have arisen partly from the unconquerable desire of
courts to create judicial legislation. Vested with the authority which they possess, it seems impossible for judges to remember that they are supposed to administer the law as it
is-not as they believe it should be. If the result obtained
from a logical interpretation violates their individual notions
of propriety or public policy, the statute is immediately circumvented. While legislatures have been vested by state
constitutions with the power to declare what the public policy
shall be the courts have, in many instances, usurped this power
and the field of automobile law is no exception. The power
to interpret is the power to nullify.
The importance of this is apparent when we recall that
the guest statutes were passed to accomplish a definite purpose. Litigation arising out of automobile accidents had
become so prolific, particularly between host and guest where
the former carried liability insurance, that the majority of
states felt it desirable to limit the host's liability. Some courts
are in accord with the spirit of the statute and to that end
do not hesitate to direct a verdict for the host where there is
no showing made of the high degree of culpability required
by statute. Other courts, regardless of the showing made
by plaintiff, are inclined to permit the jury to determine in
nearly every case whether such conduct is evident 9 -and will
9 "If the jury had found, under all the proven facts and circumstances,
that the plaintiff was in fact given proper and sufficient warning of the approach of the car, and that he was afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to remove himself from its pathway, but that the plaintiff failed and refused
to do so, then, in considering and determining the further question as to whether
or not the defendant in operating the car in the manner shown inflicted the
alleged injury willfully and intentionally, it was for the jury to consider as
one of the elements in the case, and in the light of all the proven facts and
circumstances, whether the defendant acted in good faith under what was
then and there a reasonable assumption that the plaintiff could and would
remove himself from the pathway of danger and thus avoid the injury. If
in the light of all the proven facts and circumstances the defendant reasonably
could and did rely upon such an assumption, then the element of willfulness
would have been eliminated. But, as already stated, if at the time of the
alleged injury it had become apparent to the defendant that the plaintiff did
not intend to remove himself from the pathway of the approaching car, the
remedy of the defendant would not have been to intentionally run the plain-
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often sustain a recovery under a wilful and wanton statute
where simple negligence is really the only act shown. It is
negligent, of course, to drive with defective brakes or lights,
or to drive at a fast rate of speed upon a wet pavementit may be gross negligence to pass a car on a hill or curve.
But just when does such conduct evince an utter abandon for
the consequences; or, perhaps, indicate a desire to injure the
guest or an indifference to the occurrence of such injury? If
the statute requires both wilful and wanton action, it would
appear that all of these elements must be present. Let us
see briefly what some of the courts have done in certain situations presented.
Alabama and Arizona have not yet construed their guest
statutes in this respect. California has, perhaps, some of the
most interesting results under its guest statute. That court
has held that a jury may find wilful and wanton misconduct
to exist in the following situations: An attempt to embrace
plaintiff against her will and thereby causing her to lose control of the -automobile;'10 failure to stop at an arterial hightiff down in a manner and with an instrumentality reasonably calculated
under the circumstances to cause loss of life or serious bodily injury. Under
the evidence in the trial of the case, the question of willfulness, as well as
all other questions dealt with in this paragraph, being issues of fact for the
jury, it was error to grant a nonsuit as to the individual defendant." Elrod
v. Anchor Duck Mills (1935), 50 Ga. App. 531, 179 S. E. 188; Lindsey v.
Kindt (1930), 221 Ala. 190, 128 So. 139; Allison Coal & Transfer Co. v.
Davis (1930), 221 Ala. 334, 129 So. 9; Smith v. Furness (1933), 117 Conn.
97, 166 A.,759; Elrod v. Anchor Duck Mills (1935), 50 Ga. App. 531, 179 S.
E. 188; Layton v. Ogonoski (1930), 256 Ill. App. 461; Sudinski v. Krohn
(1928), 242 Mich. 497, 219 N. W. 665; Masters v. Von Lehmden (1930), 36
Ohio App. 414, 173 N. E. 303.
10 "We agree with the conclusions reached by the trial court. That the
action of Adkins constituted willful misconduct admits of no doubt. They
were intentional and willful. The circumstances were such as to render it
probable that an accident would result from interference with plaintiffs control of tlge car. The speed of the car, the grade, the turn in the road, of
which Adkins was aware, all pointed toward danger. Without being able
to slacken the speed of the car and to control the steering wheel, it was inevitable that plaintiff would be unable to negotiate the curve, and no reason
is advanced why Adkins did not realize the danger, although his intoxication may furnish a reason for his not giving heed to it.
"There was ample proof of an intent and purpose to do the thing that
probably would result in injury, and this is sufficient to prove willful mis-
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way;11 passing cars at high speed knowing there are vehicles
approaching from the opposite direction; 12 driving at an
excessive speed in cases varying from 50 to 55, 60, and 75
miles an hour; 13 or inattention to one's driving. 14 On the
other hand the same courts have held that verdicts should
have been directed for the defendant where a car was driven
60 miles an hour on a rough road with defective equipment; 15
or where control of the automobile is lost for some reason ;16
conduct. Walker v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625, 23 P. (2) 520; Manica v.
Smith, 138 Cal. App. 695, 33 P. (2) 418. The defendant will be held to
have intended the consequences which would naturally result from his deliberate acts. Without the semblance of excuse for his misbehavior, he placed
his companion in a position of imminent danger. It is useless for him to
contend that he did not thereby court disaster." Barcroft v. Adkins (1935),
6 Cal. App. (2) 180, 44 P. (2) 379.
11 Browne v. Ferdanez (1934), 140 Cal. App. 689, 36 P. (2) 122.
12 Sanford v. Gradz (1934), 1 Cal. App. (2) 365, 36 P. (2) 652; Olson v.
Gay (1933), 135 Cal. App. 726, 27 P. (2) 922.
13Noiton v. Puter (1934), 138 Cal. App. 253, 32 P. (2) 172; Gieselman
v. Uhlman (1935), 7 Cal. App. (2) 409, 45 P. (2) 819; Candini v. Hiatt
(1935), 9 Cal. App. (2) 679, 50 P. (2) 843; Giminez v. Rissin (1936), 12
Cal. App. (2) 152, 55 P. (2) 292; Parsons v. Fuller (1936), Cal. App., 60
P. (2) 549.
14 "Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn therefrom, the
defendant, while driving her car along one of the important thoroughfares of
Los Angeles, turned her head in the opposite direction from which the automobile was proceeding and continued said conduct over a distance of over
300 feet, the plaintiff in the meantime protesting. As a result of such conduct, defendant's automobile collided with a car parked at the right-hand
curb.
* * Viewing the e-idence in this case under proper instructions
as to the law, reasonable men might well have differed in determining whether
the defendant was guilty of willful misconduct. We are not holding that
the defendant was guilty of willful misconduct; we are holding that the question should have been submitted to the jury. * * * Gross negligence and
willful misconduct are so closely akin that the line between them is not always
easy to draw, and the distinction arises frequently from the fact that willful
misconduct has the additional element of willfulness, which implies an intent
or knowledge." Frank v. Myers (1936), D. C. A. (2), 60 P. (2) 144.
15 Walker v. Bacon (1933), 132 Cal. App. 625, 23 P. (2)-520.
16Turner v. Standard Oil Co. of California (1935), 134 Cal. App. 622,
25 P. (2) 988; Lennon v. Woodbury (1935), 3 Cal. App. (2) 595, 40 P.
(2) 292; Rode v. Roberts (1936), 11 Cal. App. (2) 638, 54 P. (2) 498;
Hall v. Mazzei (1936), 14 Cal. App. (2) 48, 57 P. (2) 948; Weir v. Lukes
(1936), 56 P. (2) 987; Rhoads v. Studley (1936), Cal. App., 59 P. (2) 1082.
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or where a speed of 60 miles an hour upon a curve is shown, 17
although we have seen above that a speed of 50 miles an
hour upon a curve was so held; nor is such conduct shown
by attempting to beat another car to an intersection, 18 nor by
falling asleep at the wheel; 19 or various other causes. 20 One
17 "The facts in the case before us fall distinctly short of showing the
doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of possible consequences, and display neither the intention of doing an act which would cause
physical injury nor an attitude of mind of indifference to the probable results.
It is significant, in considering the apparent danger, that respondent though
requesting, when the car was proceeding at a speed of 63 miles an hour,
that the driver slow down, made no request or comment when the speed had
been reduced to 58 miles an hour until the car approached the curve, at
which time he yelled to the driver to 'look out'; an exclamation indicating
the need for circumspection because of the curve in the road ahead rather
than any disapproval of the speed or manner of driving. The evidence
fails to establish willful misconduct, the necessary basis for a recovery of
damages by respondent, the guest of the driver." Newman v. Solt (1935), 8
Cal. App. (2) 50, 47 P. (2) 289.

18 Squiar v. McLean (1935), 3 Cal. App. (2) 429, 39 P. (2) 437; Meek
v. Fowler (1935), 3 Cal. (2) 420, 45 P. (2) 194, see lower court's decision
(1934) 35 P. (2) 410.
19 Forsman v. Colton (1933), 136 Cal. App. 97, 28 P. (2)

429.

20"Applying these rules to the case before us, and conceding that this
driver must have known that driving on a wet road might possibly result
in injury, it seems clear that the evidence does not justify the belief that
he increased his speed with the knowledge or belief or expectation that any
serious injury was probable. He had driven a car for six years and this
particular car for one year, had driven it in the rain without its skidding, and
without doubt he believed he could do this again. If he may be said to have
disregarded the possible consequences of his act, such disregard was due to
carelessness rather than to wantonness and recklessness, and was undoubtedly
based upon his belief that no injury was probable. While he may be said
to have been recklessless in the sense of being careless, that is only negligence and is not within the statute. But the intentional doing of an act with
a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible consequences implies the
doing of such an act either with the intent that harm shall result therefrom
or in the attitude of mind of not caring if it does result in. injury. No such
intent and no such attitude of mind on the part of this appellant here appears."
Howard v. Howard (1933), 132 Cal. App. 124, 22 P. (2) 279; Horning v. Gerlack (1934), 139 Cal. App. 470, 34 P. (2) 504; Moyer v. Dresch (1935), 2 Cal.
App. (2) 655, 38 P. (2) 849; Halter v. Malone (1935), 11 Cal. App. (2)
79, 53 P. (2) 374; Bartlett v. Jackson (1936), 13 Cal. App. (2) 435, 56 P.
(2) 1298; Horn v. Volks (1936), 13 Cal. App. (2) 582, 57 P. (2) 175; Medberry v. Olcovich (1936), Cal. App., 59 P. (2) 551.
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case has gone far enough to deny a recovery where defendant
intentionally ignored a "slow" sign and collided with an
approaching car while racing upon the highway under very
21
foggy conditions.
Colorado has found a driver who was so engrossed with
love-making that he drove at a high rate of speed into a busy
thoroughfare guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct. 22 Delaware has not had a serious opportunity to really consider
this phase of its statute. Illinois, however, represents the
cream of all inconsistency. Most cases seem to be left to the
jury for decision of this technical legal issue. The test made
is as to whether or not there was a gross omission to exercise
care. This failure to exercise care, which to most students
of law is simple negligence or, at most, gross negligence, is
thereupon made the test of liability. 23 One Illinois Appellate
McLeod v. Dutton (1936), 13 Cal. App. (2) 545, 57 P. (2) 189.
22"There is evidence in this record that, at the time of the accident, defendant and a girl companion were in the front seat of the car and plaintiff
and her escort in the-back seat; that Schlesinger was driving forty to fortyfive miles per hour on one of the principle streets of Denver; that the time
was between 11:00 and 11:30 p. m.; that he was driving with one hand, had
his right arm about his companion, and was in the act of kissing her 'just a
split second before the crash'; that he had been repeatedly warned by bis
passengers of the danger incurred by reason of his conduct; that he paid no
heed, 'just laughed'; and that after the accident he requested two of his
companions to say nothing about the fact that he was driving with one hand.
"The conduct of defendant was certainly consciods, and it must be h-ld
that the possible consequences were considered and weighed by him, at least
so far as one in his evident frame of mind could consider and weigh. If
in that particular his mental processes were blurred, due to his love-making,
which was probably the fact, he must be held to the same responsibility as
one who voluntarily becomes intoxicated. We think it clear, from the evidence
above mentioned, that defendant was so intent upon what was doing that
when it became a question of ceasing or endangering the party he was
'wholly indifferent' to the 'probable injurious effect or consequences'." Schlesinger v. Miller (1935), 97 Colo. 583, 52 P. (2) 402. See the cases of Millington v. Hiedloff (1935), 96 Colo. 581, 45 P. (2) 937; Foster v. Redding
(1935), 97 Colo. 4, 45 P. (2) 940.
23 Luke v. Marion (1933), 271 Il. App. 41; Reed v. Zellers (1933), 273
Ill. App. 18; Browder v. Beckman (1934), 275 Ill. App. 193; Monroe v. Wear
(1934), 276 Ill. App. 570; Keys v. North (1935), 280 Il. App. 633, Commerce Clearing House Reports, Negligence Law Service, Requisition No. 135998;
Farley v. Mitchell (1935), 282 Il1. App. 555; Murphy v. King (1936), 284
Ill. App. 74, 1 N. E. (2) 268.
21
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Court, however, has challenged this test and repudiated it
repeatedly-requiring a proof of actual wilful and wanton
2
misconduct. '
Michigan, on the other hand, takes a very rigid interpretation of the expressions used, and has only permitted a recovery
in a very few instances. These involved situations where the
defendant drove at a high rate of speed knowing of a defect
in a tire,25 or where he drove at an excessive rate of speed
through a thick cloud of dust, 28 or at an excessive speed on
a wet highway, 27 or had gone to sleep at the wheel.28 In
every one of these cases, however, it appeared that the guests
had protested and asked to be let out of the car, but the
driver had merely increased his speed and refused to let them
disembark. There was also evidence of a highly dangerous
situation known to the defendant. Michigan has, however,
refused to allow a recovery in situations where the defendant
raced a train to the crossing, drove at high rates of speed,
gone to sleep without apparent warning, and done other acts
which, under the Illinois rule, would guarantee a verdict for
the plaintiff. 29
24 Brandt v. Franklin (1933), 272 Ill.
App. 629, Commerce Clearing House
Reports, Negligence Law Service, Requisition No. 103006; Hill v. Martin
(1935), 279 Ill. App. 648, Commerce Clearing House Reports, Negligence Law
Service, Requisition No. 134217; Peters v. Reuter (1936), 283 I1. App. 647,
Commerce Clearing House Reports, Current Decisions-Negligence, Requisition
No. 150262; Ward v. Hall (1936), 283 II1. App. 651, Commerce Clearing House
Reports, Current Decisions-Negligence, Requisition No. 151985. See also the
First District case of McGuire v. McGannon (1936), 283 Ill.
App. 293.
25 Wolfe v. Marks (1936), 277 Mich. 151, 269 N. W. 125.
26McLone v. Bean (1933), 263 Mich. 113, 248 N. W. 566; Goss v. Overton (1934), 266 Mich. 62, 253 N. W. 217.
27Lucas v. Lindner (1936), 276 Mich. 704, 269 N. W. 611.
28 Manser v. Eder (1933), 263 Mich. 107, 248 N. W. 563.
29 "As the road nears the railroad crossing, there is a gradual incline over
a distance of 20 rods, the ultimate rise being about three feet with an abrupt
drop beyond the crossing. Ten or twelve feet beyond the tracks, and in the
direction the car was proceeding, there is a decided curve to the right, with
wooden guard rails and posts on the left side of the road. There is no warning sign indicating the curve. As defendant approached the crossing and
for some distance prior to reaching it, he was driving at the rate of 62 miles
per hour. Decedent's brother warned defendant -to slow up for the railroad
tracks, and defendant replied, 'I sure can handle it.' When the car struck
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Nevada and North Dakota have not yet given a construction to the definition of wilful and wanton misconduct under
their guest acts. Ohio refused to consider that fast driving,
either in the face of blinding lights, or upon emerging from
a fog bank could constitute such conduct.30 It also held that
attempting to beat another car through an intersection was
not such an act, nor was the act of driving a car with a defective door out of which a guest is precipitated. 31 However,
the track, it left the road, it 'leaped right up,' and defendant could not make
the turn, though he tried to. The car struck the guard rails and posts, knocked
out several of them, and finally turned and dropped down the embankment,
a distance of some fifteen feet. Decedent died from his injuries within a
few hours. Defendant was also badly hurt.
"At the trial, the judge stated that he was out of sympathy with what
he termed an utterly harsh construction of the guest passenger act (Comp.
Laws 1921. Sec. 4648) and that, while he could follow the law, he did not
intend to be carried away and reserved a right to find a little balm in this
case. The jury only found a very little balm and awarded plaintiff the sum
of $650. Defendant, by proper motion, asked for direction of verdict and
judgment non abstante. The motions should have been granted. There was
no showing of wanton and willful misconduct. Excessive speed is not sufficient unless accompanied by wanton or willful misconduct. We have expressed our views in recent cases so frequently that repetition is unnecessary."
Keilitz v. Elley (1936), 276 Mich. 701, 268 N. W. 787; Oxenger v. Ward
(1932), 256 Mich. 499, 240 N. W. 55; Finkler Admr. v. Zimmer (1932), 258
Mich. 336, 241 N. W. 849; Bobich v. Rogers (1932), 258 Mich. 343, 241 N.
W. 854; Boyle v. Moseley (1932), 258 Mich. 347, 241 N. W. 849; Morgan
v. Tourangeau (1932), 259 Mich. 598, 244 N. W. 173; Willett v. Smith (1932),
260 Mich. 101, 244 N. W. 246; Wyma v. Van Anrooy (1932), 260 Mich. 295,
244 N. W. 478; Grabowski v. Seyler (1933), 261 Mich. 473, 246 N. W. 189;
Findlay v. Davis (1933), 263 Mich. 179, 248 N. W. 588; Boos v. Sauer (1934),
266 Mich. 230, 253 N. W. 278; Greenfield, Admr., v. Duluth S. Shore &
A. Ry. Co. (1934), 268 Mich. 277, 256 N. W. 438; Gifford v. Dice (1934),
269 Mich. 293, 257 N. W. 830; LeGroh v. Bennett (1935), 271 Mich. 526,
261 N. W. 81; Perkins v. Roberts (1935), 272 Mich. 545, 262 N. W. 305;
Sherman v. Yarger (1935), 272 Mich. 644, 262 N. W. 318 (in which case
the injury seemed to be almost intentionally inflicted); Fink v. Dasier (1935),
273 Mich. 416, 263 N. W. 412; Schlacter v. Harbin (1935), 273 Mich. 465,
263 N. W. 431; Crowley v. Upleger (1935), 273 Mich. 541, 263 N. W. 737;
Holmes v. Wesler (1936), 274 Mich. 655, 265 N. W. 492; Zimmerman v. Goldberg (1936), - Mich. -, 268 N. W. 837.
30 McCoy v. Faulkenberg (1935), 53 Ohio App. 98, 4 N. E. (2) 281;
Fischer v. Faflik (1936), 52 Ohio App. 69, 3 N. E. (2) 62.
81 Oliver v. Holcomb, May 19, 1936, Ohio Ct. of Appeals, Commerce Clearing House Reports, Current Decisions, Requisition No. 158652; Vecchio v.
Vecchio (1936), 131 Ohio Sup. 59, 1 N. E. (2d) 624.
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passing a car on an icy street and swerving violently to the
right after so passing has been held wilful and wanton misconduct. 2
South Dakota has refused to allow a recovery, as does
Michigan, under the "gross negligence" test of the statutestating that it is substantially synonymous with wilful and
wanton misconduct. This seems to require a very high degree
of proof, much higher than the legislators would seem to have
intended. 33 Wyoming has not yet interpreted its act upon
any of these questions.
Perhaps the author is a little harsh in his criticism of the
results reached by the various courts. There is no doubt that
it is extremely difficult to apply a test of this nature in an absolutely arbitrary manner, discarding human prejudices and
bias. But in the results reached, there is not a great deal
of consistency obtained. California has denied a recovery
to a guest where the car was driven 60 miles an hour upon
a curv6 and permitted a recovery where a speed of 50 or of
55 miles an hour was demonstrated. Michigan has permitted
a recovery where the operator drove fairly fast through a
dust cloud and denied a recovery where he drove in front of
an approaching train. Illinois applies entirely different rules
in the different Appellate *Court Districts-and the fortunes
of the defendant must vary with the composition of that
particular court. Under these circumstances we can only
plead that the court look to the statute first-give a common
sense interpretation to the language thereof, accepting the
common legal interpretation of the words contained therein,
and then apply that test as logically as possible to each factual
situation as it arises. And above all, particularly in Illinois,
the court should first be certain that the necessary intent on
the part of the operator is clearly shown before the case is
submitted to a jury. If the court believes that the result is
too harsh, it is substituting its opinion of public policy for
32 Adamisiah v. Krupski, May 19, 1936, Ohio Ct. of Appeals, Commerce
Clearing House Reports, Current Decisions, Requisition No. 158653.
33 Melby v. Anderson (1936), - South Dakota -, 266 N. W. 135. See
also the Minnesota case of Thorsuess v. Woltman (1936), - Minnesota -,
269 N. W. 637.
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that of the legislature. That is unpardonable. If the public
policy of the legislature is not one commended by justice, the
members thereof and the general public will be able to rectify
this error, but they have no such control over the court.
I Abating further discussion of the conduct of the operator
of an automobile, let us look at the conduct of the guest.
Under ordinary circumstances where simple negligence of the
party defendant is alleged, the doctrines of contributory negligence and of assumption of risk are much employed to defeat
a recovery by a guest. Can these same doctrines be applied
in cases arising under wilful and wanton allegations in guest
cases?
Courts are just as prone to utter these two expressions in
the same breath as they are to use the terms "wilful" and
"negligence" together. Yet they are entirely dissimilar.
Speaking casually, one may say that a person is negligent to
assume a certain risk-but negligence is not necessarily contributory negligence. Contributory negligence properly means
that a plaintiff is barred from recovery if his negligence concurred proximately in causing the accident. Courts applying
the doctrine to guest cases have used it more sweepingly and.
have held that it may be found where the negligence of the
guest contributes proximately to cause his own injury. By
such statement, a loophole is left for permitting a plaintiff's
verdict even where the guest may have been in the exercise
of due -care at the moment of the accident if he were negligent
in embarking in the vehicle. By so stating, the courts are, in
reality, invading the field of assumption of risk.
A person entering an automobile as a guest assumes all
known or apparent dangers-those occurring from known defective parts of an automobile, incompetence, inexperience,
or recklessness of the driver, physical incapacity of such
driver, and the like.3 4 If he later discovers such incompetence
34 See the author's more generalized discussion upon this subject in the
article "Sleeping at the Wheel", Iowa Law Review, March, 1937. Also see
Berry, C. P., Automobile, Seventh Edition, Volume 5, Section 5.104, 5.176,
5.182; Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice, Permanent Edition, Volume 4, Section 2512, page 331, Volume 4, Section 2451, 2452; Huddy
X. P., Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, Ninth Edition, Volume 5-6, Section
141-2, page 259-60.
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or some other hazardous condition after the ride has started
-

e. g., the driver becomes intoxicated

-

he assumes any

danger resulting from such condition if he does not leave the
automobile at the first reasonable opportunity.3 5 But if the
guest fails in some positive duty, such as failing to keep a
proper lookout or failing to warn the driver of imminent
dangers then he is definitely guilty of negligence contributing
to his own injury and to the accident in general.3 6 Several
jurisdictions, Illinois in particular, bar a recovery under any
85McGeever v. O'Byrne (1919), 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508; Franco v.
Vakares (1929), 35 Ariz. 309, 277 P. 812; Keller v. White et al (1927), 173
Ark. 885, 293 S. W. 1017; Lynn v. Goodwin (1915), 170 Cal. 112, 148 P. 927;
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1930), 105 Cal. App. 340, 288 P. 81; Anderson et al v. Pickens (1932), 118 Cal. App. 212, 4 P. (2) 794; Connor v.
Johnson (1933), 132 Cal. App. 449, 22 P. (2) 760; Hirsch v. D'Autremont
et al (1933), 133 Cal. App. 106, 23 P. (2) 1066; Fitzpatrick v. Cinitis (1927),
107 Conn. 91, 139 A. 639; French et ux v. Tebben et ux (1933), 53 Idaho
701, 27 P. (2) 474; Besserman v. Hines (1920), 219 Ill. App. 606; Kirmse
v. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co. (1920), 73 Ind. App. 537, 127 N. E. 837;
Archer v. Bourne (1927), 222 Ky. 268, 300 S. W. 604; Richard v Neault
(1926), 126 Me. 17, 135 A. 524; Hemington v. Hemington (1922), 221 Mich.
206, 190 N. W. 683; Rau v. Smuda et al (1928), 175 Minn. 328, 221 N. W.
232; Chapman v. Powers (1928), 150 Miss. 687, 116 So. 609; Wise v. Stagg
(1933), 94 Mont. 321, 22 P. (2) 308; Schwartz v. Johnson (1926), 152 Tenn.
586, 280 S. W. 32; Balle v. Smith (1932), 81 Utah 179, 17 P. (2) 224; Shiflett's
Admx. v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co. (1923), 136 Va. 72, 116 S. E. 500; Jensen
v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. et al (1925), 133 Wash. 208, 233 P. 635;
Wayson v. Rainier Taxi Co. et al (1925), 136 Wash. 274, 239 P. 559; Biersach et al v. Wechselberg et al (1931), 206 Wis. 113, 238 N. W. 905.
8OMarcus v. Forcier (1930), C. C. A. Mass., 38 Fed. (2) 8; Carville v.
New York Cent. R. Co. (1931), C. C. A. Mass., 53 Fed. (2) 153; Russell v.
Bayne (1932), 45 Ga. App. 55, 163 S. E. 290; Johnson v. Kushler (1933),
269 Ill. App. 553; Mattes v. Brugner (1927), 88 Ind. App. 36, 159 N. E. 156;
Shenkle v. Mains et al (1933), 216 Iowa 1324, 247 N. W. 635; Cooper v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1925), 117 Kan. 703, 232 P. 1024; Stephenson's
Admx. v. Sharp's Exrs. et al (1928), 222 Ky. 496, 1 S. W. (2) 957; Salisbury v. Boston Elevated R. Co. (1921), 239 Mass. 430, 132 N. E. 239; Lambert v. Eastern Mass. St. R. Co. (1922), 240 Mass. 495, 134 N. E. 340;
Caron v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co. (1930), 270 Mass. 340, 170 N. E. 77; Jones
v. Hester et a! (1929), - Tex. -, 16 S. W. (2) 399; Glick v. Baer et al
(1925), 186 Wis. 268, 201 N. W. 752; Krause v. Hall (1928), 195 Wis. 565,
217 N. W. 290; Sommerfield v. Flury et al (1929), 198 Wis. 163, 223 N. W.
408; Goehmann v. NatI. Biscuit Co. et al (1931), 204 Wis. 427, 235 N. W.
792; Haines v. Duffy et al (1931), 206 Wis. 193, 240 N. W. 152; Hahn v.
Smith et al (1934), 215 Wis. 277, 254 N. W. 750.
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situation illustrated, but refuse to ierm it assumption of risk
-using the broader and less accurate term, contributory
37
negligence, to apply to all of the above situations.
In guest cases where the statute requires a proof of wilful
and wanton misconduct, it would appear as a general proposition that contributory negligence of the plaintiff will not
bar his recovery. 38 This is generally assumed to be true; but
37 Reed v. Zellers (1933), 273 Ill. App. 18.
38 Most of the cases cited hereunder involve situations other than guest
cases, but the rules of law are unchanged: See also 38 A. L. R. 1424, 72 A.
L. R. 1367, 92 A. L. R. 1367; Southern Ry. Co. v. Fricks (1916), 196 Ala.
61, 71 So. 701; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Loney (1917), 199 Ala. 654, 75 So.
15; Nontevallo Mining Co. v. Underwood .(1918), 202 Ala. 59, 79 So. 453;
Alabama Power Co. v. Brown (1921), 205 Ala. 167, 87 So. 608; Alabama
Power Co. v. Armour & Co. (1921), 207 Ala. 15, 92 So. 111; 'Alabama Power
Co. v. Conine (1922), 207 Ala. 435, 93 So. 22; Cargall v. Riley (1923), 209
Ala. 183, 95 So. 821; Davis v. Smitherman (1923), 209 Ala. 244, 96 So. 208;
Boyette v. Bradley (1924), 211 Ala. 370, 100 So. 647; Godfrey v. Vinson
(1926), 215 Ala. 166, 110 So. 13; Roberts v. Kemp (1928), 218 Ala. 350,
118 So. 656; Bryson v. Phelps (1930), 23 Ala. App. 346, 125 So. 795, cert.
den., 220 Ala. 389, 125 So. 798; Southern Ry. Co. v. Randle (1930), 221 Ala.
435, 128 So. 894; Ashley v. McMurray (1930), 222 Ala. 32, 130 So. 401;
Menzie v. Kalmonowitz (1928), 107 Conn. 197, 139 A. 698; Bordonaro v. Senk
(1929), 109 Conn. 428,' 147 A. 136; Grant v. MacLelland (1929), 109 Conn..
517, 147 A. 138; Lund v. Osborne (1916), 200 111. App. 457; Manzello v.
Chicago City Ry. Co. (1917), 207 Il1. App. 15; Walldren Express & Van Co.
v. Krug (1920), 291 111. 472, 126 N. E. 97, affirming judgment Krug v. Walldren Express & Van Co. (1919), 214 II. App. 18; Land v. Bachman (1921),
223 Il. App. 473; Williams v. Kaplan (1926), 242 II. App. 166; Gannon v.
Kiel (1929), 252 Il. App. 550; Layton v. Ogonoski (1930), 256 Ill. App. 461;
Fickerle v. Herman Seekamp, Inc. (1934), 274 Il. App. 310; Siesseger v. Puth
(1931), 213 Iowa 164, 239 N. W. 46; Neessen v. Armstrong (1931), 213 Iowa
378, 239 N. W. 56; Isaacson v. Boston, W. & N. Y. St. Ry. Co. (1932), 278
Mass. 378, 180 N. E. 118; Gibbard v. Cursan (1923), 22S Mich. 311,
196 N. W. 398; Patton v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. (1926), 236 Mich.
173, 210 N. W. 309, aff. (1927), 238 Mich. 397, 213 N. W. 708; Kaiser v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. (1920), 147 Minn. 278, 181 N. W. 569; Mueller v. Dewey
(1924), 159 Minn. 173, 198 N. W. 428; Crosman v. So. Pac. Co. (1921), .44Nev. 286, 194 P. 839; Phalen v. Rae (1918), 101 Misc. Rep. 424, 168 N. Y. S.
139, judgment affirmed 184 App. Div. 922, 170 N. Y. S. 1106; Nelligar v. State
(1924), 120 Misc. Rep. 139, 197 N. Y. S. 820, judgment reversed 205 App.
Div. 734, 200 N. Y. S. 840; Nettles v. Rea (1930), 200 N. C. 44, 156 S. E.
159; Masters v. Von Lehmden (1930), 36 Ohio App. 414, 173 N. E. 303;
Conner v. Burdine (1926), 120 Okla. 20, 250 P. 109; Carlson v. Johnke (1931),
57 S. D. 544, 234 N. W. 25; Descombaz v. Klock (1931), 58 S. D. 173, 235
N. W. 502; King v. Brenham Auto Co. (1912), Tex. Civ. App., 145 S. W.
278; Tomasik v. Lanferman (1931), 206 Wis. 94, 238 N. W. 857.
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it has not been tested out in a sufficient number of cases in
the jurisdictions studies herein to permit an accurate generalization. No doubt this rule will be usually upheld as the
general tendency of courts is to permit a recovery where gross
negligence or recklessness is alleged, not involving as high a
degree of culpability on the part of defendant as that herein
discussed, even though contributory negligence is admitted. 39
Since these doctrines are so generally accepted in phases of
law other than guest cases they should certainly find a sound
application in the interpretation of statutes such as we have
considered. Our first proposition becomes, therefore, that
simple negligence of the plaintiff will not bar a recovery if
the host is guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct.
Will the doctrine of assumption of risk work any different
result? That will depend entirely upon whether or not the
risk assumed is the act or conduct upon which the liability
of the host rests. If the liability of the host is predicated
upon acts which arose purely out of customary recklessnessand the guest knew of such habitual recklessness-logically
there could be no recovery. If the liability is predicated upon
the act of driving with a defective tire resulting in a blowout,
and the guest knows of this condition, he could not recover.
Or if in any other situation the injury is a direct result of
some act charged as wilful and wanton which the guest, as
a reasonable person should have foreseen, there can be no
recovery if the guest knowingly consents to incur that danger.
Whether a recover will be permitted must depend upon the
relationship between the risk assumed and the cause of the
accident.

40

However, it must not be assumed by the reader that under
89 Banks v. Braman (1905), 188 Mass. 367, 74 N. E. 594; Kelley v. Keller
(1920), 211 Mich. 404, 179 N. W. 237; Craig v. Stagner (1929), 159 Tenn.
511, 19 S. W. (2) 234; Carsey v. Hawkins (1914), 106 Tex. 247, 163 S. W.
586; Riggles v. Priest (1916), 163 Wis. 199, 157 N. W. 755; Bentson v. Brown
(1925), 186 Wis. 629, 203 N. W. 380. But observe the South Dakota rule,
which apparently takes issue with this result. Wittstruck v. Lee (1934), 62
S. D. 290, 252 N. W. 874; FulI~r v. Pickens (1932), 59 S. D. 507, 241 N. W.
321.
40 See cases cited in notes 34 and 35.
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no circumstances will conduct of the plaintiff serve to bar
a recovery except in the above instances. This would be
absurd. To carry the question to a logical absurdity suppose
that the guest is the owner of the car or the employer of the
driver and orders the driver to do the act which is later
charged as wilful and wanton. Clearly the guest could not
recover. Now assume that the guest alleges that the host
drove in a wilful and wanton manner because he was intoxicated, but the guest himself caused, or assisted in causing,
the driver to become intoxicated. No court would, under
those circumstances, permit the guest to recover.
Those cases are, undoubtedly, extreme. But starting with
situations of that nature the courts have applied the reasoning
there involved and brought it down to apply to situations of
much lesser culpability. If the guest had sat by without
protest while the acts committed were performed, or if the
conduct complained of was so flagrantly dangerous that any
reasonable person would have vociferously protested and the
guest failed to do so, the courts have been inclined to say
that he has assisted and encouraged the host by his silence
and was equally at fault with the driver. 4 1 This, of course,
means that the court is thereby finding the guest guilty of
wilful and wanton misconduct as a matter of law.
The history of this doctrine is very interesting. If we
disregard the confusion of language found in a Minnesota
case, the following statement is helpful: "The same basic
reason which causes contributory negligence to prevent a recovery in an action sounding in ordinary negligence also prevents a recovery by one who is guilty of wilful and wanton
negligence. Such negligence is just as efficient to offset the
defendant's negligence of the same character as contributory
negligence offsets ordinary negligence. There can be no
more comparative wantonness than there can be comparative
negligence. When both parties are guilty of such negligence
41 Willgeroth v. Maddox (1935), 281 Il.App. 480; Ward v. Hall (1936),
283 Ill.
App. 651, Commerce Clearing House Reports, Current Decisions-Negligence, Requisition No. 151985; Spillers v. Griffin (1918), 109 S.C. 78, 95 S. E.
133.
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neither can be selected as that which is the proximate cause
42
and hence the law must leave both where it finds them."
That statement, although mixing the words "wilful" and
"negligence" sound very logical. As a matter of fact it is
not strictly accurate. The proximate cause of the accident may
be clearly the misconduct of the driver-such as in racing a
train to a crossing--where the conduct of the guest cannot,
in any way be considered a proximate cause of the accident.
Yet under those circumstances the guest also may be charged
with wilful and wanton misconduct so as to prevent a recovery.4 3. Is there not sqme broader theory, including a situation of this nature, upon which such denials of recovery can
be logically based?
The writer submits that from the old common law there
has been evolved such a doctrine. The courts originally used
the theory "In 'pari delicti potior est conditio defendentis"
to apply to situations tainted with fraud, usury, or other
actions where a criminal or quasi-criminal type of conduct
on the part of plaintiff is apparent.44 It, therefore, denied
42

Hinkle v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (1925),

162 Minn. 112, 202 N. W.

340 cited in 45 Corpus Juris, Section 534, page 982. Corpus Juris also cites
Southern Ry. Co. v. Carroll (1905), C. C. A. 4th, 138 Fed. 638; Q. & M.
Ry. Co. v. Eaves (1866), 42 Il. 288; L. & N. R. Co. v. McCoy (1883), 81
Ky. 403; Coal Road Construction Co. v. Tipton, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 774; Redson
v. M. Cent. R. Co. (1899), 120 Mich. 671, 79 N. W. 939; Hinkle v. M. A.
& C. R. R. Co. (1926), Minn., 202 N. W. 340; Moore v. Lindell R. Co. (1903),
176 Mo. 528, 75 S. W. 672; Spillers v. Griffin (1918), 109 S. Car. 78, 95 S. E.
133; Osteen v. AtI. C. L. R. R. Co. (1922), 119 S. C. 438, 112 S. E. 352;
Todd v. C. N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1916), 135 Tenn. 92, 185 S. E. 62, as
authoritative upon this question.
43 Wiligeroth v. Maddox (1935), 281 IIl. App. 480.
44 Stewart v. Wright (1906), C. C. A. 8th, 147 Fed. 321; Hall v. Coppell, 7 Wall 552, 19 L. Ed. 244; Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall 349, 20 L.
Ed. 453; Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 26 L. Ed. 539; Irwin v.

Williar, 110 U.

S.499, 4 S.Ct. 160, 28 L. Ed. 225; Embrey v. Jemison, 131

U. S. 336, 9 S. Ct. 776, 33 L. Ed. 172; Pullman's Car Co. v. Transportation
Co., 171'U. S. 138, 18 S. Ct. 808, 43 L. Ed. 108; McMullen v. Hoffman, 174
U. S. 639, 19 S. Ct. $39, 43 L. Ed. 1117; Harriman v Northern Securities
Co., 197 U. S. 244, 25 S. Ct. 493, 49 L. Ed. 739; Miller v. Marckle (1859),
410, 24 N. E. 867; Shipley
21 Ill. 152; Shaffner v. Pinchback (1890), 133 Ill.

v. Reasoner (1890), 89 Iowa 548, 45 N. W. 1077; Babcock v. 'Thompson
(1826), 20 Mass. 446, 15 Am. Dec. 235; Myers v. Meinrath (1869), 101
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recoveries by one person against another if both were in paridelicto. Out of this has emerged another doctrine. If a
person wilfully placed himself upon a railroad track in an
attempt to commit suicide and was killed by a'train, certainly
it would not be contended that his next-of kin could recover
for wrongful death. If, in any situation, the conduct of a
plaintiff is as culpable as that of defendant there can be no
recovery. 45 This has had particular application in railroad
cases where the plaintiff has placed himself in a situation of
danger but charges wilful and wanton conduct on 'the part
Mass. 366; Worcester v. Eaton (1814), 11 Mass. 368; Robeson v. French
(1846), 53 Mass. 24; Duffy v. Gorman (1852), 64 Mass. 45; Frost v. Gaze
(1862), 85 Mass. 560; Gregg v. Wyman (1849), 58 Mass. 322; Bryant v.
Wilcox (1904), 137 Mich. 669, 100 N. W. 918; Knight v. Linzey (1890), 80
Mich. 396, 45 N. W. 337; Kitchen v. Greenabaum (1875), 61 Mo. 110;
Williamson v. Baley (1883), 78 Mo. 636; Sprague v. Rooney (1891), 104
Mo. 349, 16 S. W. 505; Haggerty v. St. Louis Manufacturing & Storage Co.
(1898), 143 Mo. 238, 44 S. W. 1114; Green v. Corrigan (1885), 87 Mo. 359;
Morrison v. Bennett (1898), - Mont. -, 52 P. 553; Morgan v. Groff, S Denio
(N. Y.) 364, 49 Am. Dec. 273; Haynes v. Rudd (1886), 102 N. Y. 372, 7
N. E. 287; Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt. 219.
The foregoing cases do not hold that the plaintiff must in every case be
equally culpable with the defendant. If permitting a recovery would violate
public policy or encourage violations of law, there can be no recovery even
if the guilt of defendant is greater than that of'plaintiff.
45 "There is yet another element necessary to be borne in mind and submtted to the jury along with the wantonness of the defendant, and that is
the wantonness of the plaintiff; for, if the plaintiff is also wanton, his must
logically and fairly'offset the defendant's wantonness as effectually as his contributory negligence offsets the defendant's negligence. In other words, if the
case is not one of negligence, but one of wantonness, then the wantonness of
both parties must be taken into account." Holwerson v. St. Louis & S. Ry.
Co. (1900), 157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W. 770. See also: Berz Co. v. People's Gas,
Light & Coke Co. (1918), 209 Ill. App. 304; Willgeroth v. Maddox (1935),
281 Il1. App. 480; Scruggs v. B. & 0. R. R. Co. (1036), 287 Ill. App. 310;
Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Eaves (1866), 42 Ill 288; Harris v. Hatfield (1874),
71 Ill. 498; Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. McCoy (1883), 81 Ky. 403;
Heiand v. City of Lowell (1862), 85 Mass. 407; Redson v. Mich. Cent. R.
Co. (1899), 120 Mich. 671, 79 N. W. 939; Hinkle v. Minn. A. & C. R. Co.
(1925), 162 Minn. 112, 202 N. W. 340; Moore v. Lindell Ry. Co. (1903), 176
Mo. 528, 75 S. W. 672; Kinnie v. Town of Morristown (1918), 184 App.
Div. 408, 172 N. Y. S. 21; Slicker v. Seccombe (1931), 42 Ohio App. 357,
182 N. E. 131; Spillers v. Griffin (1918), 109 S. C. 78, 95 S. E. 133; Osteen
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (1922), 119 S. C. 438, 112 S. E. 352.
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of the railroad company employees. 4" It has just as logical
application to situations where a guest rides in an automobile
knowing that, under the circumstances, he accepts a known
risk or to situations where the guest is as culpable as the
47
host.
Just how does this rule apply where the guest brings a
suit against the host? Suppose the guest has charged as
wilful and wanton misconduct that the host has driven in
front of an approaching train, and the evidence shows that
the guest saw the train and neither protested against proceeding further or took any active steps for his own safety.
There has been a holding in this type of case as follows:
"From the evidence in this case we are of the opinion that
Maddox and Willgeroth were guilty of negligence or wilful
and wanton conduct to the same degree, as they both had
equal opportunity to observe the approaching train." And
46 "Plaintiff saw this train coming. He was just in the act of hitching
onto a log. Instead of immediately removing his horses, which, it is evident,
he had then ample time to do, and taking them out of danger, he ordered
the log rolled up onto the car, and, before he could then get his horses removed, both the horses and his partner, Wentworth, in charge of them, were
killed. Had injury resulted to the train, or to the trainmen, it might just
as well have been charged that he (the plaintiff) was guilty of intentional
wrong, as to charge that the engineer was guilty of it. It would then be
gross negligence against gross negligence, willful conduct against willful misconduct, and intent against intent; and in such case the law leaves both
parties where they have placed themselves and gives recovery to neither."
Redson v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (1899), 120 Mich. 671, 79 N. W. 939. Also
see Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Eaves, supra; Scruggs v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., supra;
L. & N. Ry. Co. v. McCoy, supra; Hinkle v. Minn. A. & C. R. Co, supra;
Moore v. Lindell Ry. Co., supra.
47 "We are almost constrained to feel under the circumstances that, if the
defendant was guilty of willful and wanton conduct, the plaintiff's wife and
the driver of the Ford car were likewise as equally reprehensible and that the
rule stated in Hinkle v. Minn., A. & C. R. Ry. Co., 162 Minn. 112, 202 N. W.
340, 41 A. L. R. 1377 would be applicable, that is, that where each is guilty
of willful and wanton conduct there can be no recovery, for in the case at
bar the plaintiff's wife well knew that her sister was going to turn right
at the intersection." Slicker v. Seccombe (1931), 42 Ohio App. 357, 182 N.
E. 131. See also Willgeroth v. Maddox (1935), 281 Il1. App. 480; Ward v.
Hall (1936), 283 Ill. App. 651, Commerce Clearing House Reports, Current
Decisions-Negligence, Requisition No. 151985; Scruggs v. B. & 0. Ry. Co.
App. 310.
(1936), 287 Ill.
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the same is true if the plaintiff charges that the defendant
was guilty of such conduct by placing a fatigued person at
the wheel who goes to sleep and wrecks the car, where the
evidence showed that both parties had equal knowledge of the
driver's condition. One court held: "Furthermore, appellee
was at all times in the same position to have knowledge of
the condition of Miss Scandroli as was appellant. Appellee
made no objections to anything that was done or anything that
happened on this trip. She acquiesced and made no protest
at any time to the driving of Miss Scandroli or the manner
in which she was handling the car.

*

*

*

If appellant

was guilty of wilful and wanton conduct on this occasion, so
' 49
was appellee, and there can be no recovery.
These few cases serve to indicate the general line of authority upon this question. If the conduct of the. guest is sirhilar
in nature to that of the host, he has no reason to complain
of the conduct of the latter. We have seen that the courts
have held the following acts to constitute wilful and wanton
conduct: Driving at a hight rate of speed with a boot in the
tire, failure to stop at an arterial highway, driving at excessive speeds, driving at high rates of speed when visibility
was poor, attempting to pass other vehicles when the view
was obstructed, and certain other acts. If the evidence showed
clearly that the guest was aware of the nature of the acts
at the time they were committed certainly it should be evident
that his conduct is as reprehensible as that of the host. He
joins with the host in testing manifest dangers, and is placing,
not only himself, but members of the general public in great
hazard and danger.
All of us would admit, the author is certain, that one's
conduct is gravely at fault, morally, if he permitted a friend
to shoot an innocent bystander when such act could be easily
prevented.

It is, also unpardonable if that person should

permit a friend to hurl a large stone or other deadly weapon
48 Willgeroth v. Maddox (1935), 281 Ill.
App. 480.
49 Ward v. Hall (1936), 283 Ill.
App. 651, Commerce Clearing House Reports, Current Decisions-Negligence, Requisition No. 151985.
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at another where he could easily prevent it. It is equally a
matter of common blame where one, as a guest, permits his
host to hurl an instrument of great force and violence, an
automobile, about the highways in a manner that could be
classed as wilful and wanton. If the guest assents and acquiesces in such conduct, certainly all rules of equity and
justice must combine in denying a recovery to him. Unless
such guest can show that his conduct was free from fault
under the circumstances, the guest statutes are designed to
prohibit his recovery and this purpose must be. recognized
and enforced by the courts.
The writer, frankly, is not in entire accord with the spirit
of such guest statutes as those herein discussed. It seems
extremely harsh to deny a recovery where the conduct of a
driver is grossly negligent or even reckless, where such conduct is not necessarily wilful and wanton. If the courts
properly applied the theories of assumption of risk and contributory negligence it would seem that even the common law
rule of ordinary negligence would seem a more desirable test
of liability. But regardless of personal prejudice, we must
realize that the legislatures have acted. It is the duty of the
courts to interpret such statutes in their present form-not
in the way the courts feel they should read. If such statutes
are too harsh, or are otherwise unworkable, they can be
changed by a new statute in short order. The duty of the
court not to meddle with legislation or to foist an unwarranted interpretation upon statutes is a sacred task, one sworn
to be properly fulfilled. If the judicial bodies fail in this
regard, they will rapidly lose respect in the eyes of legislatures,
attorneys, and the public in general.

